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Abstract
Risk-aversion has generally been found to decrease in income. This may
lead one to expect that poor countries will be more risk-averse than rich
countries. Recent comparative findings with students suggest the opposite,
potentially giving rise to a risk-income paradox. Findings with students,
however, may result from selection eﬀects. We test whether a paradox
indeed exists by measuring the risk preferences of over 500 household heads
representative of the highlands of Ethiopia. We find high degrees of risk
tolerance, consistent with the evidence obtained for students. We also find
risk tolerance to increase in income proxies, thus completing the paradox.
Using plausibly exogenous income proxies allows us to conclude that part of
the causality must run from income to risk tolerance. It also avoids problems
with measurement of income in developing countries that may have led to
attenuation bias in some studies. Our findings further suggest that risk
preferences cannot be blamed for the failure to adopt new technologies.
Alternative explanations are discussed.
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Introduction

Uncertainty is a central fact in economic activity, and human life more in general.
Rural people in developing countries are especially exposed to the vagaries of
fate, since their largely agricultural income strongly depends on highly variable
weather patterns and formal insurance against catastrophic events rarely exists.
Nevertheless, our understanding of risk preferences and the role they play in the
lives of rural populations in developing countries is still limited.
Poor inhabitants of developing countries have long been considered to be very
risk averse (see Haushofer and Fehr, 2014, for a recent review). This conclusion
is mostly based on the fundamental economic intuition that risk aversion should
decline in wealth or income (Arrow, 1970; Gollier and Pratt, 1996). This intuition
has indeed found considerable empirical support within various countries in the
West (Donkers, Melenberg and Van Soest, 2001; Dohmen, Falk, Huﬀman, Sunde,
Schupp and Wagner, 2011), although the evidence is less uniform than one might
think (see Hopland, Matsen and Strøm, 2013, for a recent review).1
The evidence for developing countries is even less clear. Binswanger (1980)
famously found no correlation between risk aversion and wealth, and Tanaka,
Camerer and Nguyen (2010) found a correlation only with average village income but not with personal income, and only for some parameters. Yesuf and
Bluﬀstone (2009) found risk aversion to decrease in the availability of cash in
Ethiopia, and Liebenehm and Waibel (2014) found the risk aversion of cattle
farmers in Burkina Faso and Mali to decrease in income. Gloede, Menkhoﬀ and
Waibel (2013) found risk tolerance to increase with income in two large rural samples in Thailand and Vietnam. Cardenas and Carpenter (2013), however, found
no correlation between risk preferences and economic well-being (an aggregate
measure of several wealth indicators) in an experiment in six Latin-American
1

Even though there is considerable support for this hypothesis, not all studies find clear-cut
evidence for the relationship. For instance, and von Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengström
(2011) only found the correlation for gain-loss prospects, and not for pure gain prospects (see
also Booij, Praag and van de Kuilen, 2010). Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2007) even found an
eﬀect to the contrary in the Danish population, while Noussair, Trautmann and van de Kuilen
(2014) found a significant eﬀect of income in a representative sample of the Dutch population
only after controlling for household wealth.

2

countries.
Measurements of risk preferences in developing countries have also often confirmed high degrees of risk aversion on average (Binswanger, 1980; Liebenehm
and Waibel, 2014; Yesuf and Bluﬀstone, 2009). They did, however, generally
employ tasks that are seldom—if at all—used in the West, which makes comparisons diﬃcult. The choice lists employed are further asymmetric, limiting the
degree of risk seeking they can detect. Especially in the presence of noise, such
asymmetric choice lists may result in the systematic overestimation of risk aversion (Andersson, Tyran, Wengström and Holm, 2015). If some subjects decide
purely randomly, their choices may be counted towards risk aversion in lists that
are skewed towards the detection of the latter. In particular, the Binswanger
task is cut oﬀ at risk neutrality, so that any random choice would be counted
towards risk aversion. Using simulations as well as experimental data, Crosetto
and Filippin (2015) showed that Binswanger-style lists overestimate risk aversion,
and that noise indeed compounds this overestimation—a problem that may be
particularly important in samples with low education levels.
In contrast to the high risk aversion found in these studies with rural populations, recent cultural comparisons of risk preferences using student samples and
employing the exact same experimental tasks across a large number of countries
have found risk aversion to be considerably lower in developing countries than in
rich, developed countries (Rieger, Wang and Hens, 2014; Vieider, Lefebvre, Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk and Martinsson, 2015). Taken together
with the prevalent within-country result of risk aversion decreasing in income,
the finding of risk aversion increasing in income per capita between countries
suggests a risk-income paradox (Vieider, Chmura and Martinsson, 2012). Since
these comparative results were obtained with students, however, it remains unclear whether they may be due to a selection eﬀect, whereby in poorer countries
children from relatively more aﬄuent families attend universities. In that case,
rather than finding a paradox, we might just observe systematic selection eﬀect.
In this paper, we test whether the between country results obtained with
students extend to a representative sample of the rural population of Ethiopia.
3

While students constitute a relatively homogeneous group in terms of observable
characteristics, a comparison in terms of average risk preferences of the general
population nevertheless promises to shed some light on the importance of selection eﬀects in students (Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2010). We
measure the risk preferences of a large sample of the Ethiopian rural population,
covering regions of rural Ethiopia encompassing about 80% of the Ethiopian population and 70% of its landmass. We focus on the rural population, inasmuch
as 81% of the population of Ethiopia lives in rural areas (World Bank data for
2013), and rural populations have been described as particularly risk averse in
previous research (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014), so that they constitute a stronger
test for our hypothesis than urban populations. Notwithstanding some growth
over the last decade, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world,
with a GDP per capita of $1354 in 2013 using PPP. This makes the sample an
ideal testbed for whether the findings with students extend to poor countries.
We measure risk preferences using choice lists between lotteries or prospects
and sure amounts of money. These tasks are commonly used in the West (Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido and Wakker, 2011; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2010;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and have the advantage of being comparable to
the above-mentioned evidence collected with students. This will allow us to assess
whether the diﬀerent results described above are due to diﬀerences in elicitation
tasks or diﬀerences in subject pools. We further obtain several measurements
of risk preferences for each person, allowing us to econometrically separate risk
preferences from noise. This may be important, as noise in the measurement of
risk preferences may be one of the factors aﬀecting correlations with income in
previous investigations.
Obtaining good income measures is often not trivial for the subsistence farmers that make up most of our sample—a fact that may contribute to the inconsistent evidence on the risk-income relationship (correlations with wealth, which
is easier to measure, tend to be weaker and less consistent in general). Instead of
measuring income directly, we thus recur to income proxies such as land size and
altitude, which have been found to correlate strongly with income in agricultural
4

populations. This reduces measurement problems, and has the further advantage that such income proxies can be plausibly considered as exogenous, allowing
us to make inferences on the direction of causality. Indeed, causal evidence on
the risk-income relationship remains scant (see below for a discussion), possibly
because economists have long considered risk preferences to be innate—a stance
that is now increasingly being abandoned (see e.g. Zilibotti and Doepke, 2012,
for a discussion of this point).2
We find that the rural population of Ethiopia is highly risk tolerant, thus
departing from traditional conclusions about developing country samples. At the
same time, we find a strong correlation of risk tolerance with income proxies, indicating that more aﬄuent households exhibit higher risk tolerance. By restricting
our attention to exogenous income proxies, we then provide some evidence on a
causal eﬀect from income to risk preferences. Finally, we discuss the implications
of our findings in terms of the failure to adopt new technologies by poor households in developing countries, which has often been blamed on low risk tolerance.
Given the high levels of risk tolerance we find in the aggregate, such an account
does no longer seem to hold up (although the explanation may remain valid for
the poorest and most vulnerable households within our sample).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the subject pool and
provides details on the experimental tasks and procedures, as well as discussing
data quality. Section 3 presents the results. We start out by presenting some
non-parametric data at the aggregate level, and then discuss the stochastic assumptions and econometric methods used to fit functional forms to the data.
Then we look at correlations with socio-economic variables, in particular income
proxies and indicators of socio-economic conditions in childhood. Finally section
5 discusses the results and concludes the paper.
2

One of the reasons why innate preferences are unlikely to be the full story is the increasing
evidence for a role of socialization in the detrmination of preferences. For instance, Booth and
Nolen (2012) showed that girls are less risk averse when coming from an all girls school relative
to a coed school, or when they are randomly assigned to an all-female group than when assigned
to a mixed-sex group. Bacon, Conte and Moﬀatt (2014) showed further that the correlation
in risk preferences within couples increases with years of marriage, thus indicating a role of
assimilation in addition to associative mating.

5

2

Experimental setup

2.1

Subject pool characteristics

A total of 504 household heads were recruited in three regions in the Ethiopian
highlands.3 The study was carried out in the context of an investigation of
the eﬀectiveness of improved cookstoves under the REDD+ program (a United
Nations program aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation). This focus
also determined the stratification technique used to select the sample. Subjects
were selected from the three regions involved based on forest cover, with 20% of
subjects from Amhara, 50% from Oromia, and 30% from the Southern Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNP ; out of the total population of the three
regions, Amhara makes up approximately 29%, Oromia 46%, and SNNP 15%, so
that Amhara is slightly undersampled). These regional states represent 80% of
the population and over 70% of the land area of Ethiopia.
Thirty-six villages (locally called Got or sub-Kebele) were randomly selected
from the three regions from a list of 110 villages previously selected by the
Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI ) to collect forestry data. Out
of the 110 sites, we removed 15 sites that were covered during a pilot survey conducted to inform our research. We also removed all sites from Tigrai Regional
State, as this state was less interesting in terms of the REDD+ questions asked
in the study. We then randomly selected 36 villages from the remaining list. For
each of these villages, a list of households was obtained from the local administration. Subsequently, 14 households were randomly picked from each village using
systematic random sampling. This ensured a sample size that could be covered
with our research budget, while at the same time ensuring wide geographical coverage. The data were collected by a total of 25 fieldworkers (5 supervisors and 20
enumerators) who were extensively trained on the experiments. The supervisors
3

The exclusive use of household heads is unlikely to significantly aﬀect our conclusions.
Studying 347 rural Ethiopian couples, Di Falco and Vieider (2015) show that spouses’ risk preferences are not significantly diﬀerent from those of their husbands (although female household
heads are much more risk averse than male household heads). This is also consistent with a
recent meta-analysis by Filippin and Crosetto (2015), who show that gender diﬀerences are
task specific and may be weaker than thought.
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all held a BSc degree and were experienced in field survey work. The enumerators and supervisors were selected so that they were able to speak the local
languages. The experimental procedures were refined in a pilot before starting
the actual experiment, which also gave the enumerators a chance to train on the
tasks. Supervisors paid particular attention to making the enumerators follow
standardized procedures.4
The average age of our subjects is 42.13 years (SD: 13.2), with a range between
20 and 90 years. Since the study was targeted at household heads, 89.9% of
respondents are male. At 91% the overwhelming majority of our subjects work
mainly in the agricultural sector, with the second largest group consisting of
women doing house work (5%), and the third largest of people owning a business
(2%). The median household has about 1.5 ha (about 3 acres) of land. About
38% of the respondents are illiterate, with the literate subjects having mostly
only primary education (45% of the sample).

2.2

Experimental tasks and explanations

We measure risk preferences using certainty equivalents (CEs). CEs are easy
to construct and to deploy. Physical representations of the choice problems are
straightforward. In contrast to tasks such as the one popularized by Holt and
Laury (2002), which have been found to result in high rates of inconsistencies
(Charness and Viceisza, 2012; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Walkowitz and Wichardt,
2011), only monetary amounts vary within a given choice list, while probabilities
stay fixed. This makes it easy to lay out money on a table and represent probabilities physically, which is a great advantage given people’s familiarity with money.
CEs can also easily be used to estimate one’s favorite decision model (although
more CEs are typically required for more complex models). Finally, while they
allow for structural model estimation, they are also straightforward to analyze
non-parametrically.5
4

Since several languages needed to be covered, the assignement of enumerators to villages
was not randomized, so that we cannot control for enumerator fixed eﬀects in our regressions.
5
Some scholars have raised doubt on whether CEs are ‘realistic’ in the sense of modelling
real world decision processes, based on the observation that real choices occur between risky
alternatives. We are unconvinced of this argument. For one, many choices in the real world do
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In a typical task or choice list, a subject is oﬀered repeated choices between
a lottery or prospect and diﬀerent sure amounts of money. The prospect oﬀers a
probability p of obtaining a prize, x, or else an outcome y with a complementary
probability 1 p. We will represent such a prospect as (x, p; y). The sure amounts
sj are always included between the prize and the low outcome of the prospect,
i.e. x

sj

y. The extreme outcomes of the prospect, x and y, are explicitly

included in the list of sure amounts to serve as a rationality check. If such
extremes are not included and subjects always choose either the prospect or the
sure amount (i.e., they never switch), it may be diﬃcult to determine whether
this is due to true preferences or to a misunderstanding of the task. As long as
preferences are consistent, i.e. subjects switch only once (see below), the certainty
equivalent can then be taken to be the mean between the first sure amount that
is chosen over the prospect, and the last sure amount for which the prospect was
preferred over the safe option.
In this experiment, we fix the prize of the prospect at 40 Birr and the lower
outcome at 0 throughout. The prize of 40 Birr corresponds to about US $6 in
purchasing power parity (World Bank 2013), for an overall expected payoﬀ from
participating equal to $3 PPP for a risk neutral participant. Considering that
most of our subjects live on less than two Dollars a day, the money at stake
was significant and well in line with stakes in similar experiments (Attanasio,
Barr, Cardenas, Genicot and Meghir, 2012; Yesuf and Bluﬀstone, 2009). We
used a total of 7 choice lists, which oﬀered a prize of 40 Birr with probabilities
of p = {0.05, 0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 0.70, 0.90, 0.95}, and which were administered in

random order. Using several choice lists has the advantage that noise can be
easily separated from preference parameters in the econometric analysis.
The sure amounts increased from 0 to 40 Birr (included) in steps of 1 Birr.
Having a relatively small resolution again reduces noise, as can thus assign risk
preferences to subjects with a higher degree of precision (Crosetto and Filippin,
indeed involve tradeoﬀs between sure amounts and risky options (e.g., the decision whether to
pay a sure amount of money for fertilizer to invest in a risky payoﬀ from agriculture that may
depend on other variables such as rainfall). Ultimetely, the question of external validity is one
that needs to be addressed empirically, and no conclusive evidence on this point exists to date.
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2015). Probabilities were implemented using 20 ping-pong balls, with balls of
diﬀerent colors associated to the high and low outcomes. The composition of
balls was physically shown to subjects for each choice list. We chose to keep
outcomes fixed across choice lists while changing probabilities, as we believe that
for typical experimental stakes most of the interesting patterns emerge along the
probability dimension (see also Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012, on this point). This
will restrict our model to one subjective dimension, so that more complex models
which allow for two subjective dimensions, such as prospect theory, cannot be
estimated based on our data. This methodology can, however, easily be expanded
to the latter.6
Subjects were initially asked whether they consented to take part in the study.
They were explained that the study consisted of various parts, including a questionnaire, and an experimental game. Before beginning the actual experiment,
subjects were carefully explained the process. All explanations and subsequent
elicitations took place in individual interviews. Subjects were shown how the
urn was composed. They were then shown the prospect, which was explained
by laying out banknotes next to the associated colored ping-pong balls used as
chance device. Subjects were asked to choose between this prospect and the
sure amount, also physically laid out next to the prospect. The enumerator introduced the example by explaining the entire choice list. Subjects were then
asked for their choice between the prospect and 0 Birr for sure; and then for
their choice between the prospect and 40 Birr for sure. Given that for the first
everybody ought to prefer the prospect and for the second everybody ought to
prefer the sure amount, this quite naturally conveys the idea that subjects should
only switch once (which was not enforced in case subjects still wanted to switch
to and fro in the experiment).
Once a subject had understood this process, the enumerator began eliciting
the preferences for diﬀerent probability levels in random order. This random or6

In particular, some choice tasks varying outcomes at a given probability are needed to
separate utility curvature from probability transformation in the econometric analysis. To
obtain good power for the observations, prospects with a non-zero lower outcome are necessary
in addition to varying upper outcomes.
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der had been predetermined, and each enumerator could read the order from the
interview sheet (there were 14 diﬀerent orders in total). Since the outcomes stayed
the same throughout the experiment, the enumerator only needed to change and
explain the color composition of balls from one task to the other. While enumerators were instructed to ask for a preference for each of the 41 sure amounts,
in some instances participants would say that their preferences would stay the
same for all higher amounts, or would even directly indicate where they wanted
to switch from the prospect to the sure amount. In such cases, the enumerators were instructed to simply encode this switching point directly. The total
experiment including the explanations took about 30-40 minutes on average.7
At the end of the risk experiment, one of the choice lists was randomly selected for real play—the standard procedure in this kind of experiment (Cubitt,
Starmer and Sugden, 1998). In that choice list, one choice between a given sure
amount and the prospect was then extracted for play, so that overall each decision had the same probability of being played for real. This procedure had been
thoroughly explained to subjects while presenting the example at the beginning
of the experiment. Subjects were explicitly asked to repeat the randomization
procedure to the enumerator before starting with the actual experiment. Subjects
were also told explicitly that, given this procedure, it was in their best interest
to treat every single decision as if it were the one that would be played for real
money at the end.

2.3

Data quality

The overall data quality is reasonably good. Only 3 out of 504 subjects, or 0.6%
of our sample, switched multiple times from the prospect to the sure amount
and back in the choice lists. We will exclude these subjects from the analysis,
leaving us with 501 subjects. A further test of rationality are what we call strong
violations of first order stochastic dominance, consisting in a preference for 0
Birr for sure over playing the prospect, or of playing the prospect over 40 Birr for
7

This 40 minute period excludes the time needed for the questionnaire, which was asked in
a separate instance.
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sure. No subject preferred the sure 0 Birr to the prospect. On the other hand,
4 subjects, or 0.8% of the sample, indicated a preference for the prospect over
40 Birr for sure in at least one of the choice lists. These subjects will also be
excluded from the analysis. Finally, for one subject we do not have responses to
the questionnaire, leaving us with a total of 496 subjects.
We next look at (ordinary) violations of stochastic dominance. Such a violation occurs whenever a subject indicates a certainty equivalent for a given
prospect that is lower than the certainty equivalent indicated for another prospect
oﬀering a lower probability of obtaining the same prize, CE(pj ) < CE(pi ),
pj > pi . About 38% of our subjects violate stochastic dominance at least once.
Seen that most violations are relatively small in terms of amounts, this appears to
lie within acceptable bounds, considering also the random ordering of the tasks.
Vieider, Truong, Martinsson and Pham Khanh (2013) found that about 25% of
Vietnamese farmers violated stochastic dominance in a similar setting using a
fixed ordering of tasks. Looking at total choices, our subjects violate first order
stochastic dominance in 5.4% of choices overall. Overall, we thus conclude that
the data are reasonably consistent, but that controlling for noise in the analysis
will be important.

3
3.1

Aggregate data and modeling approach
Non-parametric representation of aggregate data

We start by conveying a feel for the data through non-parametric summary statistics for the diﬀerent prospects, shown in table 1. Taking the mean CE over all
the prospects (shown in the last row of the table), we find that subjects are on
average significantly risk seeking. Looking at individual prospects, we see that
subjects are risk seeking for small probabilities and risk averse for large ones, as
has typically been found in the literature. However, the risk seeking behavior
prevails up to and including a probability of p = 0.5, which is much higher than
has been found in the West. This serves to exclude explanations purely based on
psychological factors that may lead subjects to switch closer to the middle of the
11

list—a point to which we will return once we fit functions to the data.
The findings are, on the other hand, consistent with recent findings across
30 countries with students using the same type of tasks reported by Vieider et
al. (2015). This confirms that subjects in poor countries tend to be considerably
more risk tolerant than subjects in industrialized countries, and that this finding
remains valid beyond students subject pools.
Table 1: Summary measures of aggregate risk preferences by prospect
prob.

median CE

mean CE

SD

test =EV

0.05
0.10
0.30
0.50
0.70
0.90
0.95

7.5
9.5
15.5
22.5
29.5
34.5
37.5

10.88
13.53
18.05
23.01
27.13
32.01
34.38

10.37
10.19
10.05
9.12
8.58
8.51
8.17

z = 18.21, p < 0.001
z = 17.84, p < 0.001
z = 11.51, p < 0.001
z = 6.26, p < 0.001
z = 1.49, p = 0.136
z = 7.33, p < 0.001
z = 6.54, p < 0.001

mean

22.07

22.71

7.30

z = 8.19, p < 0.001

We can now show how our data fit into diﬀerent models in a purely nonparametric way. Finding a good descriptive model to fit the data is important
inasmuch as this will improve our econometric analysis of the determinants of
preferences, reducing potential attenuation bias. We further discuss our modeling assumptions in some detail, as they will determine our choice of functional
forms to be used, and since not all readers of development papers may be deeply
familiar with the concepts and models employed. Since the data patterns we find
are relatively complex, they cannot be explained by one simple measure of risk
aversion. The use of overly simple measures of risk preferences may indeed be
partially to blame for past null findings in correlation analysis, as such measures
may confound actual preferences with noise.
We start with an expected utility (EU ) model. Since utility functions are
unique only up to an aﬃne transformation, we can arbitrarily fix the endpoints
at u(y) ⌘ 0 and u(x) ⌘ 1. Plugging this into the general equivalence u(CEi ) =

pi u(x)+(1 pi )u(y), we now simply obtain that u(CEi ) = pi . The non-parametric
mean utility function thus obtained is plotted in figure 1(a). This utility function
resembles the one proposed by Markowitz (1952). Markowitz recognized that

12

people may be risk seeking for some prospects while being risk averse for others,
so that the utility function would have convex as well as concave sections. To
accommodate this finding, he proposed to abandon initial wealth integration and
to instead measure utility though changes of wealth.8 This type of referencedependence has by now been widely integrated into EU models (Diecidue and
van de Ven, 2008; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007; Sugden, 2003; von Gaudecker et al.,
2011).

(a) Nonparametric EU function

(b) Nonparametric Dual function

Figure 1: Non-parametric functions

Markowitz based the derivation of this type of utility function on a simple
thought experiment. In this experiment, he asked readers about their choices
between a prospect oﬀering a prize x with probability p = 0.1 or else nothing
and the expected value of the prospect. For small x, most people would likely
choose the prospect (e.g., most people would prefer a prospect oﬀering a one
in ten chance of $10 over $1 for sure). As x got larger, however, people would
gradually switch to preferring the sure amount (e.g., most people would prefer a
sure $1,000,000 over a prospect oﬀering a one in ten chance at $10,000,000).
In our case, however, we kept the amounts fixed, and let probabilities vary
instead, i.e. we elicited CEi ⇠ (x̄, pi ; ȳ), where the bar indicates that values
are unchanging across choice lists and ⇠ indicates indiﬀerence. One could still

perceive such behavior as being driven by the value of the prospect, since the
8

With initial wealth integration, convex and concave sections of the utility function might
co-exist at the same point, since the same pattern has been found for all kinds of wealth levels,
thus giving rise to inconsistencies.
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expected value of the prospect increases with the probability of winning the prize.
However, in a seminal paper Preston and Baratta (1948) let both outcomes and
probabilities vary systematically across choices. What they observed was that
outcome variation had a negligible eﬀect on the data (although the outcomes
did obviously not range up to the amounts indicated in Markowitz’s thought
experiment). Even more importantly, the pattern across diﬀerent probability
levels remained constant, no matter what the outcome level. This pattern gave
rise to much experimentation by psychologists in subsequent years, and hit the
economic discipline when probability weighting was incorporated into prospect
theory jointly with utility transformations and published in Econometrica by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
This consistent pattern across probabilities, which we also find in our data,
suggests a diﬀerent approach to modeling the choices we observe. One could
model risk preferences through a subjective transformation of probabilities into
decision weights, rather than a subjective transformation of outcomes into utilities. In other words, we can represent a choice as being linear in outcomes and
non-linear in probabilities, such that CE = ⇡(p)x + [1

⇡(p)]y, where we will

impose that ⇡(0) ⌘ 0 and ⇡(1) ⌘ 1. In our case, we can again simply solve
this, noting that in our setting ⇡(pi ) =

CEi
x .

This non-parametric Dual function

is depicted in figure 1(b), and can be seen to exactly mirror the utility function to its left (see Yaari, 1987, for an axiomatization of the Dual function for
rank-dependent utility).9
Being the dual of each other, the two functions presented above are prima
facie perfectly equivalent. Nonetheless, we have a strong preference for the dual
function. The experimental stimuli varied probabilities across choice lists. The
same type of pattern—combining risk seeking for small and risk aversion for
large probabilities—has been found for diﬀerent outcome levels, which directly
contradicts EU with a Markowitz-type utility function (similar violations would
9

One could also think of this model as a prospect theory model with linear utility. Indeed,
linearity of utility can often not be rejected in prospect theory models for typical experimental
stakes. For instance, Vieider et al. (2013) fail to reject linearity in utility for their Vietnamese
farmer sample. Linearity also holds for many (although not all) of the student samples mentioned above—see L’Haridon and Vieider (2015) for details.
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be observed for the Dual, if we had used significant variations in outcomes instead). Also, as we will further discuss below, the coexistence of risk seeking and
risk aversion requires two-parameter functions to fit the data. Such functions are
much more common, and the parameters have a clearer interpretation, under the
dual theory than under EU. An analysis using a one-parameter utility function
is nonetheless reported in the appendix.

3.2

Stochastic modeling

We have so far only derived non-parametric functions from the data. While this
involves the least tampering with the data, such an approach completely neglects
one of the strengths provided by a multiplicity of observations—the possibility
to separate noise from genuine preferences. This will lead to attenuation bias in
regression analysis, since the noise in the measurements will aﬀect the correlations
with our socio-economic variables. In this section, we will thus try to both reduce
the number of parameters needed to describe the data (relative to the seven nonparametric data points), and to develop an explicit stochastic structure that
allows us to filter out noise from the observations. Alas, this does not come for
free. We will need to add some more assumptions, as well as some complexity to
the data estimation. Annotated Stata programs for all estimations in the paper
are available for download at www.ferdinandvieider.com.
Following Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper (2010), we econometrically represent
decisions directly using the switching points from the prospect to the sure amount.
This takes into account the structure of the experimental setup, in which we elicit
certainty equivalents for prospects, cei ⇠ pi , where the subscript i indicates
the particular prospect at hand, such that pi = (x, pi ). This approach takes

into account that choices within a given choice list are not independent. It is
also much more eﬃcient than a discrete choice approach, drastically reducing
estimation time. All the results remain stable if a discrete choice approach is
used instead.
We start from the observation that at the switching point the utility of the
certainty equivalent is by definition equal to the utility of the prospect. Since
15

outcomes enter the equation linearly, we can simply write:

ce
ˆ i = ⇡(pi )x + [1

(1)

⇡(pi )] y = ⇡(pi )x

where ce
ˆ i is the certainty equivalent predicted by our model. This predicted
certainty equivalent will not necessarily be equal to the one observed in the
actual data. For instance, decision makers may make mistakes when calculating
the utility of a prospect, or our model may be mis-specified relative to the true
underlying decision process. We can thus represent the relation between the
predicted and observed certainty equivalent as follows:
(2)

cei = ce
ˆ i + ✏i
where ✏i ⇠ N (0,

2)

is an error term which captures the deviations mentioned

above. We can now express the probability density function

(.) for a given

prospect i as follows

(✓,
where

i , pi )

=

1
i

✓

ce
ˆ ✓i

cei
i

◆

(3)

is the standard normal density function, and ✓ indicates the vector

of parameters to be estimated. The subscript i to the noise term

serves to

remind us that we allow noise to depend on the characteristics of the single
prospect. Since our prospects are, however, invariant except for the probability
of winning the prize, this error term simply takes the form

i

= x, which serves

to standardize the error term of the model.10
The parameters of the model can be estimated by maximum likelihood procedures. To obtain the likelihood function per decision maker, we need to take
10
Many other specifications are conceivable in principle, but a thorough investigation is beyond the scope of this paper. Wilcox (2011) proposed a contextual utility specification,whereby
the error term is made to depend on the diﬀerence in utility between the highest and lowest
outcome in the prospect. Notice that we are fulfilling this criterion, since in our setup either
utility is linear or the utility endpoints are normalized to 0 and 1, and such endpoints are
invariant across choice lists. In any case, the type of choice representation used here is not
subject to the criticism by Wilcox—see Apesteguia and Ballester (2014) for a discussion.
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the product of the density functions above across prospects:

L(✓) =

N Y
Y

(✓n ,

(4)

ni , pi )

n=1 i

where ✓ is the vector of parameters to be estimated such as to maximize the
likelihood function. The subscript n to ✓ indicates that we will allow the estimated parameters to be linear functions of observable characteristics of decision
makers in the regression analysis, such that ✓ˆ = ✓ˆk + X, where ✓ˆk is a vector of
constants and X represents a matrix of observable characteristics of the decision
maker. The subscript n to the noise term

indicates that the error is also made

to depend on the observable characteristics of the decision maker.11
Taking logs, we obtain the following log-likelihood function:

LL(✓) =

N X
X

n=1

ln [ (✓n ,

ni , pi )]

(5)

i

We estimate this function in Stata 12 using the Broyden-Fletcher-GoldfarbShanno optimization algorithm. Errors are always clustered at the subject level.

3.3

Aggregate data fitting

We are now ready to fit functional forms to our preference data. In figure 2 we fit
a 2-parameter function developed by Prelec (1998) to the data, which takes the
form ⇡(p) = e

( ln(p))↵ .

The estimated parameters are ↵ = 0.538 (se = 0.013),

= 0.703 (se = 0.009), and

= 0.233 (se = 0.002). The result is vastly superior

to to the fit of Prelec’s 1-parameter function characterized by
the additional parameter worthwhile (

2 (1)

⌘ 1, thus making

= 646.95, p < 0.001, likelihood ratio

11
Yet a diﬀerent approach would be to estimate a mixture model, allowing for heterogeneity
in modelling assumption. Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2010) do so for several diﬀerent
countries in the developing world. Notice, however, how we could not use these methods
to distinguish between EU and dual-EU, as they model the same processes through diﬀerent
parameters. While such methods could be used to distinguish between one- and two-parameter
functions, one-parameter functions are a special case of the two-parameter setup in our case.
Directly estimating the two-parameter function thus facilitiates the interpretation of regression
results, without losing any generality in terms of modeling.
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test).12 An analysis using a 1-parameter EU function is provided in the appendix.

Figure 2: Fitting 2-parameter functions to the data

The parameters of the Prelec function have a precise behavioral interpretation. A parameter combination of ↵ = 1 and

= 1 in combination with linear

utility indicates expected value maximization. The parameter

mostly governs

the elevation of the function, with values >1 indicating a more depressed function and thus risk aversion under linear utility, and values <1 indicating a more
elevated function, and hence risk seeking. When ↵ = 1,

can thus be consid-

ered a measure of standard risk aversion. The parameter ↵ governs mostly the
slope of the curve, with values <1 indicating probabilistic insensitivity, i.e. CEs
that change less than proportionately with probabilities. This is a phenomenon
whereby people attribute greater weight to a given change in probability if it happens towards the endpoints of the scale close to p = 0 or p = 1 than if the same
probability change occurs in an intermediate region. It is one of the most established findings in the prospect theory literature (Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt
and Pinto, 2000; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996). Since linear probability weighting is
12
The parameters of the 1-parameter function are ↵ = 0.572 (se = 0.013) and = 0.256
(se = 0.003). This function has a fixed crossing point of the diagonal at 1/e = 0.37. Other
1-parameter and 2-parameter functional forms perform similarly.
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considered to be normative (Wakker, 2010), probabilistic insensitivity is often
perceived as a rationality failure (Tversky and Wakker, 1995).13 We will refer to
the two parameters as the risk aversion and the sensitivity parameter respectively.

4

Risk preferences and socio-economic conditions

4.1

Parametric analysis

We are now ready to examine the correlation of our measures with several characteristics of interest using our structural model (a non-parametric stability analysis
is provided in the next section). We start by looking at indicators of wealth and
income. Especially in developing countries there is a dearth of evidence on the
eﬀect of income, probably because good income measures are diﬃcult to come by
amongst the poor inhabitants of the rural regions of developing countries, who
more often than not are subsistence farmers.
Table 2: Summary statistics of main regressors
mean

SD

min

max

land size (hectares) 1.80
1.61
0
10.5
altitude (meters)
2218 337.31 1437
3150
age (years)
42.13 13.14
20
90
literate
0.453 0.498
0
1
middle school
0.169 0.375
0
1
female
0.101 0.301
0
1
unmarried
0.086 0.281
0
1
TLUs⇤⇤
4.990 3.669
0
26.23
pc1 wealth⇤⇤⇤
0
1.214 -3.415
2.912
⇤⇤ TLU stands for Tropical Livestock Units
⇤⇤⇤ Wealth is represented as the first principal component of several indicators

Rather than trying to obtain income measures—which would be unreliable
in a sample consisting for the most part of subsistence farmers—we thus look at
some variables likely to be closely associated with income. Table 2 summarizes
the income proxies used, along with several other controls in the regression. The
land size owned by our households ranges from 0 to 10.5 hectares, with a mean
of 1.80. Notice how land size is indeed a proxy for income—and specifically not
13

The parameter may also capture some systematic noise—as opposed to the truely random
noise captured in —consisting in answers that are systamatically closer to the midpoint of the
choice list.
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a measure of wealth—in the present context, as it is illegal to buy or sell land
in Ethiopia. While the use of land size as an income proxy clearly glosses over
behavioral issues such as e.g. the use of fertilizer or eﬀort expended on the farm,
we consider this a strength of this measure, as it reduces the likelihood of causality
running in the opposite direction. We do not have direct measures of income in
our sample. However, using data collected in a representative survey run by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), which is representative of
an area largely overlapping with our study area in the Ethiopian highlands, land
size and income show a clear positive correlation (⇢ = 0.318, p < 0.001, N = 892;
Spearman rank correlation). This further confirms the validity of land size as an
income proxy.
Our second income proxy is altitude. This measure is taken from GPS measurements, and measured as elevation above sea level. At between about 1450
and 3150 meters, the range of elevations in our data is significant. The productivity of land decreases with altitude for several reasons. Rainfall is generally
scarcer at high altitudes. This eﬀect is compounded by stronger winds, which
tend to dry out the top soil. Furthermore, land at high altitude is often steeper,
which means that water drains quickly and soil is easily eroded, leading to reduced soil quality and hence lower agricultural productivity. And finally, the
lower temperatures prevalent at high altitudes lead to slower growth of crops.
Recurring again to the same IFPRI data mentioned above, we indeed find a negative correlation between income and altitude (⇢ =

0.096, p = 0.004, N = 886).

Nonetheless, altitude is clearly an imperfect proxy, as agricultural practices will
also change with altitude. In particular, we find that at increasing altitudes land
is increasingly used to graze livestock, i.e. there is a significant correlation between altitude and the tropical livestock units (TLUs) owned by a household in
our data (⇢ = 0.127, p = 0.005, N = 487). It is thus important to control for this
in regression. There is no correlation between land size and altitude.14
14

Altitude may, in principle, also have eﬀects on the disease environment, with tropical
temperatures at lower altitudes likely resulting in a higher prevalence of diseases such as malaria.
Notice how this may reverse the eﬀect we predict, as poor health is generally associated with
reduced risk tolerance (Akay, Martinsson, Medhin and Trautmann, 2012). We do, however,
not find a significant correlation between altitude and self-declared health state (⇢ = 0.014,
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Table 3 shows our regression results. Regression I looks at proxies for income,
while controlling for level of education, business ownership, and some demographics including the sex and age of the respondent, and his marital status. We find
land size to be highly correlated with risk preferences, with larger land ownership
being associated with higher risk tolerance as indicated by a smaller

parame-

ter, as we hypothesized. We also find higher altitudes to be related to reduced
risk tolerance, again as hypothesized. Higher altitudes are also associated with
increased probabilistic sensitivity. Adding an interaction term between land size
and altitude (not shown) does not yield any additional insights. Regression II
tests the stability of the findings by adding indicators of wealth. In particular,
we add tropical livestock units owned. This is important inasmuch as farmers
at higher altitudes increasingly switch to livestock. In addition, we add the first
principal component of wealth constructed out of a number of wealth indicators
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001), such as number of houses owned, number of rooms,
whether the house has a water closet, materials of roof and wall, and whether
the household has a private telephone. Adding these variables does not yield additional insights. Importantly, the eﬀects of altitude (as well as land size) remain
significant.
We also find some eﬀect for the demographic controls. Most notably, we
find unmarried subjects, which make up about 9% of the sample, to be less
risk averse, and older and female subjects to be more risk averse. These eﬀects
correspond to the majority of results in the literature, although not all of them
are uncontroversial. For instance, while gender eﬀects have often been found
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009), they may be sensitive to the elicitation task and
decision context (Filippin and Crosetto, 2015), as well as socialization (Booth and
Nolen, 2012). Notice, however, that females in our sample are female household
heads. Female-headed households are also likely to be poorer than male-headed
households on average and particularly vulnerable, which may partially explain
the strength of the gender eﬀect we find (see also footnote 3).
p = 0.752), likely because none of our subjects live at particularly low altitudes (for instance,
malaria is virtually inexistent in the Ethiopian highlands). Since we did not find a direct eﬀect
of health on risk preferences either, we will not further mention this variable.
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Table 3: Income and wealth
I

II

↵
land size
altitude
literate
middle school
business
female
age
unmarried
TLUs

↵

-0.015
(0.017)
0.046***
(0.015)
0.012
(0.034)
0.048
(0.053)
-0.038
(0.098)
-0.110
(0.067)
-0.006
(0.018)
0.029
(0.075)
(0.058)

-0.057***
(0.020)
0.085***
(0.024)
0.060
(0.045)
0.116*
(0.070)
0.079
(0.143)
0.207**
(0.089)
0.050**
(0.020)
-0.193**
(0.083)
(0.069)

0.003
(0.008)
-0.036***
(0.005)
0.005
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.018)
-0.038
(0.052)
0.029
(0.028)
-0.014***
(0.005)
-0.013
(0.021)
(0.018)

-0.006
(0.019)
0.040**
(0.017)
-0.001
(0.035)
0.035
(0.052)
0.064
(0.114)
-0.106
(0.071)
-0.009
(0.018)
0.001
(0.075)
(0.059)
-0.000
(0.017)
-0.017
(0.015)

-0.054**
(0.024)
0.087***
(0.028)
0.062
(0.046)
0.117*
(0.071)
0.038
(0.165)
0.204**
(0.091)
0.047**
(0.021)
-0.186**
(0.087)
(0.071)
-0.005
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.015)

0.002
(0.008)
-0.035***
(0.006)
0.004
(0.013)
0.002
(0.019)
-0.049
(0.061)
0.028
(0.028)
-0.015***
(0.006)
-0.012
(0.021)
(0.018)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.006
(0.006)

X

X

X

X

X

X

0.675***
(0.040)

0.637***
(0.039)

0.181***
(0.013)

0.689***
(0.043)

0.636***
(0.041)

0.178***
(0.014)

wealth pc1
Region dummies
constant

Subjects
493
493
493
486
486
LL
12, 335.17
12, 335.17
12, 335.17
12, 163.75
12, 163.75
Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Continuous independent variables are entered as z-scores (land size, elevation, age, TLU)

486
12, 163.75

There is little evidence to date on the direction of causality in the correlation between risk aversion and income.15 Gloede et al. (2013) showed that risk
preferences in Thailand and Vietnam are influenced by several types of shocks using experimentally validated survey questions (Hardeweg, Menkhoﬀ and Waibel,
2013), but it is unclear whether the eﬀect of these shocks passes purely through
income or whether they have a direct, possibly psychological, eﬀect on risk preferences. Tanaka et al. (2010) used an instrumental variables approach, but did so
only for the utility curvature parameter, for which they did not find a significant
eﬀect of income in the first place.16
15

Guiso and Paiella (2008) found an eﬀect of windfalls in wealth on a hypothetical question
about finacial investment. Since financial investments are strongly dependent on wealth levels
in the first place, however, it is unclear whether this is a true eﬀect on preferences.
16
To be precise, they did not find a significant eﬀect of either personal or average village
income on utility curvature in the OLS regressions. They found a marginally significant eﬀect
of mean village income (but not of personal income) in the 2SLS regression, but did not discuss
the possibility of a direct eﬀect of their instruments on risk preferences. No IV regression is
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Given that there is little migration in Ethiopia (Di Falco and Bulte, 2013), the
altitude at which a family lives can plausibly be taken as exogenous. This means
that the eﬀect of altitude detected in the regression above can be interpreted
as causal. For land size, the story is more complicated, as the legitimacy of
any causal interpretation will depend on how the land has been acquired, and
whether risk preferences may have influenced this acquisition. Table 4 replicates
regression I above, but restricts the sample to the roughly 52% of subjects who
declare to have inherited their land from their parents (as opposed to having
obtained it through land redistribution, 44%, or through other means 3%).17
Restricting the sample in this way serves again to establish exogeneity of the
variable, since the size of the land owned in this case has not been influenced
by the household head.18 If anything, the correlation between land size and
risk tolerance is stronger in this sub-sample, suggesting indeed a causal relation
running from income to risk tolerance. Once again, the causal relationship can
only be plausibly established. Indeed for land size, we cannot completely exclude
other explanations based on parents passing on their risk preference together
with the land. Given relatively low intergenerational correlation coeﬃcients of
risk preferences, however, we find such an alternative account to be much less
plausible than the one presented here.

4.2

Stability analysis

In this section, we replicate the main findings from above using non-parametric
data. While non-parametric analysis will likely result in weakened results due
reported for the loss aversion coeﬃcient, which shows a negative correlation with mean village
income (but not personal income) in the OLS regressions.
17
Since 1975, all land in Ethiopia is public property. There used to be land redistribution at
the village levels through the 1990s by local committees. While family size was supposed to be
the main criterion, it is suspected that corruption strongly influenced redistribution decisions.
Since the 1990’s, land certification and registration has started, giving farmers permanent title
to the land. Given the role of family size and corruption in land redistribution, we cannot
be assured of the exogneity of land allocations. If we nontheless only use the subsample that
has obtained the land by redistribution, we again find a significant eﬀect of land size on risk
tolerance.
18
Altitude no longer has a significant eﬀect on average risk preferences, captured by , in
this subsample. Notice however that altitude is likely exogneous in the whole sample, so that
the loss of significance in this subsample is of little concern.
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Table 4: Income and wealth
↵
land size
altitude
literate
middle school
business
female
age
unmarried
Region dummies
constant

-0.065**
(0.029)
0.071***
(0.027)
-0.010
(0.050)
0.087
(0.079)
-0.156
(0.096)
-0.090
(0.070)
-0.013
(0.032)
0.068
(0.121)

-0.062***
(0.023)
0.029
(0.031)
0.103*
(0.055)
0.150*
(0.081)
0.172
(0.165)
0.180**
(0.084)
0.100***
(0.035)
-0.311***
(0.093)

0.011
(0.014)
-0.023**
(0.011)
0.028
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.020)
-0.008
(0.063)
-0.035
(0.022)
-0.013
(0.010)
0.051
(0.039)

X

X

X

0.675***
(0.071)

0.641***
(0.071)

0.120***
(0.016)

Subjects
253
253
253
LL
6256.69
6256.69
6256.69
SEs in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Continuous independent variables entered as z-scores

to the noise incorporated in the measures, this is nevertheless useful in order to
establish the stability of our main findings. Table 5 shows the three regressions
from the two tables in the previous section, using OLS with robust standard
errors. The dependent variable is now simply constructed as the average certainty
equivalent per person.19 Regression I shows that land size still shows the expected
eﬀect, with larger land holdings being correlated with larger certainty equivalents
on average, and thus increased risk tolerance. Altitude shows a significant eﬀect
in the opposite direction, again as seen previously. Regression II adds the first
principal component of wealth and tropical livestock units. None of these wealth
indicators are significant, while altitude remains highly significant. Land size also
remains significant, but only at the 10% level. The lower significance is likely due
to the collinearity with tropical livestock units, and is of little import here, since
the controls were mostly inserted to test the stability of the altitude variable.
Finally, regression III uses only the restricted sample of households having
19

Alternatively, we could use a panel data approach and enter the probability as an independent variable. This yields the same results, so that we prefer to report this simpler version of
the regression.
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Table 5: Nonparametric stability analysis
dep. var.: mean(CE)
land size
altitude
literate
middle school
business
female
age
unmarried
TLUs

I

II

III

0.891***
(0.344)
-1.096***
(0.356)
-1.093
(0.761)
-1.955*
(1.148)
-0.922
(2.154)
-3.302**
(1.498)
-0.868**
(0.360)
2.743*
(1.472)

0.798*
(0.413)
-1.108***
(0.413)
-1.256
(0.776)
-2.073*
(1.167)
0.336
(2.380)
-3.298**
(1.526)
-0.895**
(0.367)
2.714*
(1.520)
0.113
(0.416)
0.139
(0.279)

0.836*
(0.489)
-0.489
(0.475)
-1.624
(1.105)
-1.706
(1.371)
-1.777
(3.060)
-3.217*
(1.905)
-1.780***
(0.577)
5.747***
(2.031)

X

X

X

24.266***
(0.725)

24.295***
(0.785)

23.479***
(0.847)

pc1
Region fixed eﬀects
constant

Subjects
493
486
252
R2
0.06
0.06
0.07
Robust SEs in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Continuous independent variables are entered as z-scores

inherited their land. Again, we can replicate most of the eﬀects found previously.
The eﬀect of land size, however, is only marginally significant in this setting.
Altitude is no longer significant, but this is of little consequence, as altitudes is
plausibly exogenous for the whole sample.

5

Discussion and conclusion

We have examined the risk preferences of rural Ethiopian households using certainty equivalents. The results expand and generalize recent findings according
to which students in poor countries are on average more risk tolerant than students in rich, industrialized, countries. In particular, the finding of high levels
of risk tolerance in one of the poorest countries in the world indicates that the
diﬀerences found in the student comparison are not merely due to systematic
selection eﬀects of relatively richer students in poorer countries, but that this
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result indicates a more general phenomenon. The negative correlation between
risk tolerance and GDP found in the between country data contrasts markedly
with the prevalent within-country evidence. Here we find a positive correlation
of risk tolerance with income proxies, in agreement with a large (if not always
consistent) body of evidence from industrialized countries (Dohmen et al., 2011;
Donkers et al., 2001; Hopland et al., 2013). These opposing eﬀects of national
income between countries and personal income within countries gives rise to a
risk-income paradox.
Vieider et al. (2012) explain this paradox recurring to unified growth theory,
and in particular the hypothesis developed by Galor and Michalopoulos (2012).
In poor societies that find themselves in a Malthusian equilibrium, relatively
aﬄuent, risk tolerant people have the largest number of children. Since risk
preferences are transmitted within the family, risk tolerance spreads in the population. As societies grow richer, however, the aﬄuent are the first to substitute
quality for quantity of children (Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990). As more
aﬄuent families decrease the number of children, poorer families at first increase
them, since the income constraint is no longer binding. This in turn leads to an
inversion of the equilibrium and the spread of risk aversion.
Most evidence on risk preferences in developing countries stems from studies using a single choice list (Binswanger, 1980; Yesuf and Bluﬀstone, 2009).
Responses to such a list may, however, be contaminated by noise. One of the
presumed virtues of the Binswanger list is that it does not allow for any noise
to register in the response, given that subjects are asked to pick their favorite
amongst a list of lotteries. This, however, makes it impossible to tease apart
econometrically how much noise played into the response, and in general preference data and noise can thus not be separately identified. Andersson et al.
(2015) showed how noise may systematically be counted towards risk aversion
in some choice list designs, thus resulting in spurious correlations. This criticism particularly applies to the Binswanger design—given that the choice list is
capped at risk neutrality, random choices will be systematically counted towards
risk aversion. A curious outlier in this respect is Akay et al. (2012), who found
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high levels of risk aversion eliciting CEs with poor farmers in Ethiopia. The latter finding appears to be driven mostly by subjects who consistently chose the
sure amount for all choices. Since the design did not include the lower outcome
of the prospect, however, it is hard to tell whether this behaviour reflects true
preferences, or whether it is driven by misunderstanding the task.
The findings of considerable risk tolerance by our subjects raises the question
what may be driving the reluctance to adopt new technologies that has often
been observed in developing countries, and which has frequently been attributed
to risk aversion. In the face of this evidence, such a conclusion does not appear to
be tenable—at least not in any simple sense. One possible alternative explanation is that reluctance to switch to new technologies may be driven by downward
risk exposure—the extend to which basic consumption needed for survival would
suﬀer in the case of an adverse shock (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011). Other explanations obviously exist as well, including low trust in the information provided
by outsiders, slow information diﬀusion through social networks, etc. This is an
important question raised by our data, the investigation of which will hopefully
shed some fresh light on what induces people to take risks in real life decisions
beyond their pure risk preferences as measured in economic experiments.
Risk preferences have often been shown to correlate with income (Dohmen
et al., 2011; Hopland et al., 2013; Vieider et al., 2013). At the same time, parts
of the literature have examined the correlation of risk preferences with behavior
(e.g., Liu, 2013). An element that most of these studies have in common is that
the direction of causality was either bypassed by assuming innate preferences, or
that only correlation results were presented. In the present study, we took a step
in the direction of formally addressing causality by using exogenous proxies for
income. While this showed that some of the causality seems to run from income
to risk tolerance, this does not exclude the opposite direction of causality, since
we cannot exactly quantify the eﬀect in our reduced from regressions.
Although not being the main point of our analysis, our results have shown
that both allowing for a stochastic structure and choosing a flexible enough model
to fit the data well may be important for correlation analysis. Clearly, our pre27

liminary insights into this issue are not conclusive, and more research is needed
to determine the generality of this finding. An additional methodological point
is that certainty equivalents, so far rarely used in development economics but a
standard tool in decision theory, hold great promise for the application with poor
and often illiterate subjects. Comparing diﬀerent sure amounts of money to a
prospect with a constant probability is easy to explain and represent physically,
and appears to produce good results. In this paper, we have concentrated on
eliciting such certainty equivalents for pure gain prospects. Indeed, they provide
the cleanest test for our hypotheses, as one need not worry about giving subjects
endowments from which losses are deducted as in pure loss or mixed prospects,
and about whether subject integrate these endowments into their decisions or not.
Nonetheless, the method is easily extendable to pure loss and mixed prospects
if the research questions makes this desirable, as is the case if one wants to find
correlations with many real world decisions.
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A

Results using 1-parameter EU

In the present section, we estimate the same regressions as in the main text
using an expected utility framework with a power utility formulation. This will
leave our econometric apparatus above intact, except that our predicted certainty
equivalent now takes the following form:

ce
ˆi = u

1

[pi u(x) + (1

pi )u(y)] = u

1

[pi u(x)]

(6)

where utility takes the form u(x) = x⇢ (alternative functional forms produce
similar results). The fit of the resulting function to the nonparametric data is
shown in figure 3. As already discussed above, this one-parameter function does
not provide a good fit on average, as it cannot account for both risk seeking and
risk aversion. Rather, it reflects the average pattern of risk seeking, resulting in a
parameter estimate of ⇢ = 1.634 (se = 0.065), and thus a globally convex utility
function.

Figure 3: Fitting 2-parameter functions to the data

Table 6 shows the same four regressions as above using the expected utility
formulation. Both land size and altitude have the expected significant eﬀects
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in regression I. In regression II, land size has an even higher coeﬃcient and is
marginally significant. While the structural modeling improves our correlations
somewhat relative to the non-parametric measures, several eﬀects that were significant with the 2-parameter model are not picked up. This is likely due to the
bad fit of the 1-parameter model. The complex patterns of risk seeking combined
with risk aversion visible from the nonparametric data points cannot be accommodated by such a function. This, in turn, means that error rates will be larger.
And indeed we can see that the standard errors in the expected utility model are
considerably larger than the ones seen in the dual model presented above.
Table 6: Stability analysis EU
I

II

⇢
land size
distance road
altitude
literate
middle school
business
female
age
unmarried
region fixed eﬀects
constant

0.186***
(0.066)
0.054
(0.081)
-0.280***
(0.076)
-0.159
(0.104)
-0.250
(0.222)
-0.366
(0.309)
-0.329*
(0.188)
-0.179***
(0.048)
0.446**
(0.185)

⇢
0.007
(0.009)
0.003
(0.009)
-0.036***
(0.007)
0.002
(0.015)
-0.005
(0.020)
-0.030
(0.054)
0.040
(0.029)
-0.012*
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.024)

0.293*
(0.156)
0.119
(0.132)
-0.134
(0.137)
-0.216
(0.150)
-0.389
(0.244)
-0.429
(0.446)
-0.293
(0.254)
-0.290***
(0.074)
1.027**
(0.450)

0.032*
(0.019)
0.004
(0.014)
-0.019
(0.018)
0.025
(0.020)
-0.029
(0.026)
0.021
(0.063)
0.001
(0.029)
-0.017
(0.012)
0.043
(0.045)

X

X

X

X

1.830***
(0.117)

0.193***
(0.015)

1.915***
(0.252)

0.143***
(0.022)

N_clust
493
254
chi2
45.85
49.57
Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Continuous independent variables are entered as z-scores
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